Equity and trusts [2016] by TANG, Hang Wu
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
7-2017
Equity and trusts [2016]
Hang Wu TANG
Singapore Management University, hwtang@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TANG, Hang Wu. Equity and trusts [2016]. (2017). Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of Singapore Cases. 17, 436-450.
Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2361
 
436 SAL Annual Review (2016) 17 SAL Ann Rev 
 
15. EQUITY AND TRUSTS 
TANG Hang Wu 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Cantab), PhD; 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Express trusts 
15.1 Kuntjoro Wibawa v Harianty Wibawa1 is an interesting case 
which deals with the world of offshore trusts in relation to modern 
wealth management. The Wibawa family was a wealthy Indonesian 
family. The family patriarch died in 2000 and the matriarch, Harianty 
Wibawa, was appointed to be the sole executrix and trustee of the 
patriarch’s Will. While the Will provided for the patriarch’s property to 
be distributed to Harianty and their sons and daughters, the distribution 
never took place. Instead, Harianty settled a trust called the Pride Wise 
Trust. The Pride Wise Trust was set up because the family received 
letters from the Indonesian tax authorities inviting the family to attend 
at their offices in Jakarta to discuss their US-dollar denominated assets. 
The structure of the Pride Wise Trust is shown in the diagram below: 
 
 
                                                                        
1 [2016] SGHC 109. 
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15.2 The Pride Wise Trust was a discretionary trust governed by 
Jersey law. It had a total asset value of US$33m and the potential 
beneficiaries included members of the Wibawa family. The plaintiff who 
was one of the sons, Kuntjoro Wibawa, was named the first protector 
and a potential beneficiary. Harianty’s planning objectives for setting up 
the trust was to facilitate a family succession plan, asset protection, 
privacy, and avoiding of probate. Belinda Ang Saw Ean J explained the 
rationale of the trust succinctly as follows:2 
… As is the usual way with an offshore discretionary trust, the 
beneficiaries would not be regarded as having any direct legal rights 
over any particular portion of the trust fund; they only had a right to 
be considered when the trustees exercised their discretion. In such 
trusts, the paramount desire and expectation is for financial 
information to be kept private and confidential. The use of a 
discretionary trust in conjunction with an underlying company was 
designed to protect assets in a tax haven. This combination would 
interpose an additional layer of confidentiality in the chain of 
ownership of the trust fund … 
15.3 Subsequently, Kuntjoro had a fallout with his mother, Harianty, 
and brought the present suit against her. Kuntjoro’s primary complaint 
was that he had not received his inheritance and he sued Harianty for 
failing to apply for grant of probate and withholding his inheritance 
from his late father. After a careful review of the evidence, Ang J 
dismissed Kuntjoro’s claim because her Honour found that Kuntjoro had 
consented to the setting up of the Pride Wise Trust. In fact, Ang J said 
that Kuntjoro was instrumental in setting up the Pride Wise Trust and 
he knowingly transferred assets belonging to the patriarch’s estate to the 
offshore company in order to enable Harianty to set up the trust. The 
learned judge held that by virtue of the defence of concurrence, 
Kuntjoro was estopped from claiming against Harianty for settling the 
estate’s assets into the Pride Wise Trust. 
15.4 The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR v Westacre 
Investments Inc3 contains useful observations in relation to the 
requirements of an express trust. The following passage by Sundaresh 
Menon CJ explaining the certainty of intention appears destined to be 
regarded by lawyers and law students as the primary definition:4 
[C]ertainty of intention … requires clear evidence of an intention on 
the part of the alleged settlor to create a trust and to subject the trust 
property to trust obligations, as opposed to creating any other form of 
                                                                        
2 Kuntjoro Wibawa v Harianty Wibawa [2016] SGHC 109 at [40]. 
3 [2016] 5 SLR 372. 
4 The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR v Westacre Investments Inc [2016] 
5 SLR 372 at [55]. 
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binding legal relationship (for example, a contractual relationship). 
The intention of the alleged settlor must be to dispose of the property 
so that somebody else to the exclusion of the disponent acquires the 
beneficial interest in the property … [emphasis in original] 
15.5 On the facts, the learned Chief Justice held that there was no 
trust because the agreement was entered on the basis of Yugoslav law 
rather than Singapore law. Yugoslav law had no concept of the trust as a 
legal mechanism and, hence, the parties could not have contemplated 
that they were creating a trust. Furthermore, the parties could not have 
intended to create a trust given they had no knowledge of Singapore law 
and did not seek Singapore legal advice prior to signing the agreement. 
15.6 This case is also important because the Court of Appeal 
discussed the beneficiary’s entitlement to sue third parties in relation to 
trust property. The judgment creditor was a company called Westacre 
Investments Inc (“Westacre”), and the judgment debtor was a state-
owned company called The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR 
(“Yugoimport”). Yugoimport wholly owned a subsidiary called Deuteron 
(Asia) Pte Ltd (“Deuteron”), which was a Singapore company. Deuteron 
had funds in the Singapore branch of a bank called DnB Nor Bank. 
Westacre obtained provisional garnishee orders against Yugoimport and 
DnB Nor Bank and sought to make these garnishee proceedings 
absolute. In order for Westacre to succeed in obtaining a garnishee order 
against Deuteron, Westacre must show there was a debt owing from 
Deuteron to Yugoimport. Westacre argued that Deuteron owed 
Yugoimport a debt because Deuteron held some funds on a bare trust 
for Yugoimport. It was argued that this gave rise to a debt. Looking at 
the various financial documents, Menon CJ found that Deuteron did 
hold the funds on a bare trust for Yugoimport. The learned Chief Justice 
also held that a bare trustee was “obliged to convey the moneys it holds 
on trust for the beneficiary as and when the beneficiary demands for 
them”.5 His Honour accepted the submission that a bare trustee owes the 
beneficiary a debt in equity once the beneficiary has demanded that the 
trust moneys be handed over to him. In other words, the bare trustee 
and beneficiary are simultaneously in a debtor–creditor relationship and 
a trustee–beneficiary relationship. On the facts, Deuteron owed an 
equitable debt to Yugoimport which could be garnished. 
15.7 With regard to the garnishee order against the DnB Nor Bank, 
the Chief Justice refused to make the garnishee order absolute. His 
Honour reasoned that in garnishee proceedings, a pre-existing debt 
must be shown to exist and the judgment creditor merely intercepted 
                                                                        
5 The State-Owned Company Yugoimport SDPR v Westacre Investments Inc [2016] 
5 SLR 372 at [107]. 
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the debt already owing to the judgment debtor. Here, DnB Nor Bank 
only owed a debt to the legal owner of the accounts, that is, Deuteron 
and not Yugoimport. The fact that a legal procedure known as the 
Vandepitte6 procedure existed, whereby Yugoimport as a beneficiary 
could sue Deuteron and join DnB Nor Bank as a party to the action, did 
not have the effect of making DnB Nor Bank the debtor of Yugoimport. 
Therefore, there was no basis for the garnishee order. 
Resulting trusts 
15.8 The case law on resulting trusts this year is full of examples of 
family disputes over property. Chia Hang Kiu v Chia Kwok Yeo7 involved 
a dispute between siblings over a bungalow in Jalan Kechubong 
(“bungalow”). The bungalow was initially registered in the names of the 
late father, the late mother, and their fourth son who is called Chia Kok 
Weng as tenants in common in equal shares. A series of transfers over 
the years resulted in the property now being registered in the names of 
Chia Kwok Yeo (the third son) and his wife, Ng Chui Guat (“Angie”). In 
the present suit, the estate of the late father was suing Angie and Yeo 
claiming that there was a resulting trust of the bungalow in favour of the 
estate. Consolidated with this suit was the action that Weng was taking 
against Angie and Yeo, claiming one-third beneficial interest in the 
bungalow. This claim arose from the fact that Weng had transferred his 
one-third share of the property to Yeo for a purported price of 
S$126,000. The parties did not dispute that this sum was not paid. With 
regard to the estate’s claim, it was asserted that the late father’s sole 
intention in transferring the property to Yeo was to prevent the 
bungalow from being seized by creditors since the late father’s business 
was in financial difficulty. In fact, the late father was made bankrupt. 
After a careful review of the evidence, Valerie Thean JC found that Yeo 
had provided full consideration for the late father’s share of the 
bungalow by taking up a fresh loan in his own name. Therefore, any 
claim based on resulting trust in this context failed. Similarly, there was 
no common intention to hold a share of the bungalow for the late father 
and, hence, the claim for common intention constructive trust also 
failed. With regard to Weng’s claim, Thean JC found that Weng had 
intended an outright transfer to Yeo. Two factors persuaded the learned 
judicial commissioner to reach this conclusion. First, Weng applied for a 
Housing & Development Board (“HDB”) flat and declared that he did 
not own any interest in private property. Second, Yeo’s conduct in 
investing substantial amounts of money to rebuild the bungalow was 
consistent with Yeo being the absolute owner of the bungalow. An 
                                                                        
6 Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp of New York [1933] AC 70. 
7 [2016] SGHC 198. 
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interesting and unexplored issue in this case is whether the declaration 
to HDB that Weng did not own any private property might give rise to a 
plea of illegality in relation to a trust claim over the bungalow. No doubt, 
this is an issue which will arise in subsequent cases. 
15.9 Chin Kim Yon v Chin Kheng Hai8 was a dispute between a father 
and a son over ownership of a property. The father paid for the purchase 
of a Hillview condominium and registered it initially in the names of his 
daughter and son. Subsequently, the son refused to sell the property or 
transfer the property to his father. The son relied on the presumption of 
advancement in his favour to resist a resulting trust claim by his father. 
Tan Lee Meng SJ reviewed the case law and state and nature of the 
relationship to determine whether the presumption of advancement was 
relevant in the present context. In the end, Tan SJ held that a 
presumption of advancement applied in the present case. This decision 
is notable because the presumption of advancement was applied in a 
situation of a parent and an adult offspring. 
15.10 Chau Thi Thanh Lang v Lo Lai Heng9 is yet another case dealing 
with a family dispute. The dispute was essentially between Mdm Chau 
Thi Thanh Lang (“Mrs Leo”), who was the widow of Mr Leo Wey Jack 
(“Mr Leo”), and Mdm Lo Lai Heng (“Mdm Lo”), who was Mr Leo’s 
mother. Mr Leo and Mdm Lo owned an HDB flat as joint tenants. When 
Mr Leo passed away, Mdm Lo registered herself as the sole owner of the 
flat. Mrs Leo filed a caveat and instituted the present proceedings 
against Mdm Lo. Mrs Leo asserted that Mr Leo had contributed 91.79% 
towards the purchase price of the flat and, therefore, there was a 
presumption of resulting trust in favour of Mr Leo’s estate. In response, 
Mdm Lo resisted the claim on the ground that Mr Leo had been 
unhappy with Mrs Leo and intended to give the property to Mdm Lo 
instead. Chua Lee Ming JC (as his Honour then was) held that these 
allegations were unfounded and that a resulting trust over the property 
did arise in favour of the estate. 
Constructive trusts 
15.11 Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard10 was a dispute 
between a widow and her daughter and son-in-law. The plaintiff (the 
widow) and defendants (the daughter and son-in-law) purchased a 
private property at Jansen Road. The plaintiff was registered as having 
10% legal interest while the daughter and son-in-law had 90% interest. 
                                                                        
8 [2016] SGHC 2. 
9 [2016] SGHC 13. 
10 [2016] 5 SLR 302. 
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Subsequently, the relationship between the parties broke down. The 
plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to either 10% share or a share 
proportional to her financial contribution to the purchase price, which 
exceeded 10%. In contrast, the defendants argued that they were entitled 
to all or part of the plaintiff ’s share by reason of a common intention 
constructive, proprietary estoppel, or resulting trust. Aedit Abdullah JC 
declared that the plaintiff held a 10% beneficial interest in the property 
and ordered a sale in lieu of partition. The learned judicial 
commissioner considered that the evidence did not support the 
plaintiff ’s claim for more than 10% since she could not demonstrate that 
she had contributed more than 10% of the purchase price. Similarly, the 
defendants’ claims for common intention constructive trust, proprietary 
estoppel, or resulting trust were dismissed on lack of evidence. The 
significant portion of this decision is the discussion on the elements in 
relation to the common intention constructive trust. Abdullah JC 
observed:11 
… The incurring of detriment provides a reasoned basis for 
unconscionability and hence enforcement, but may arise later. Hence 
if detriment is not incurred, the constructive trust is effectively not 
enforceable even against the promisor. If detriment is incurred, the 
equitable interest in the property is given effect, even against third 
parties unless they are purchasers of the legal interest for value 
without notice. 
15.12 The passage above, albeit only dicta, suggests that detriment 
(and reliance) remains relevant in analysing the common intention 
constructive trust in Singapore. In England, it is unclear whether the law 
has moved on from the requirement of detriment and reliance, at least 
in cases where the property is registered in joint names. Indeed, in Jones v 
Kernott,12 Lord Walker and Baroness Hale of Richmond appeared to 
endorse that once common intention is established, the shares of the 
parties are determined by observing “that each is entitled to that share 
which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of 
dealing between them in relation to the property”. Thus, the inquiry 
under English law, at least in joint name cases, is not cast in terms of 
requiring detriment and reliance. However, there is also a fairly recent 
English Court of Appeal case dealing with a single name case where the 
claim failed because of the lack of detriment and reliance.13 No doubt, 
this issue will require clarification from the Singapore Court of Appeal 
in the future. 
                                                                        
11 Sumoi Paramesvaeri v Fleury, Jeffrey Gerard [2016] 5 SLR 302 at [62]. 
12 [2012] 1 AC 776 at [32]. 
13 See Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404. 
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15.13 Simgood Pte Ltd v MLC Barging Pte Ltd14 is a refreshingly short 
judgment by the Court of Appeal. In this case, Simgood Pte Ltd 
(“Simgood”) had sued MLC Shipbuilding Sdn Bhd (“MLC Shipbuilding”) 
for a breach of contract to construct and deliver a vessel. Apart from this 
contractual action, Simgood sued eight other defendants comprising, 
inter alia, affiliate companies, shareholders, and directors of MLC 
Shipbuilding and its affiliate companies for, inter alia, a remedial 
constructive trust. The claim on remedial constructive trust was 
dismissed because Simgood did not stipulate who was to be the 
constructive trustee or provide any legitimate reason or basis to justify 
the invocation of the doctrine of remedial constructive trust. 
15.14 Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin15 involved a bitter family feud 
over the Will and property of the family patriarch when he passed away. 
This review will only focus on the trust aspects of the case. Kannan 
Ramesh JC (as his Honour then was) had to grapple with the tricky 
relationship between resulting trusts and the common intention 
constructive trusts. After reviewing the Singapore jurisprudence, 
Ramesh JC said that the steps may be summarised in four broad strokes. 
First, where the parties’ financial contributions are different from their 
registered legal interests, there is a presumption of resulting trust that 
the parties’ beneficial interests are held in proportion to their respective 
financial contributions. Second, the preceding analysis will be displaced 
if there is evidence of a common intention that the parties should hold 
the beneficial interests in the property in a proportion that differs from 
what is presumed. However, care must be taken not to impute a 
common intention on the parties. Third, where a purchase price 
resulting trust arises absent evidence of a common intention, the 
presumption of a resulting trust may be displaced if one party intends 
the financial contribution to be a gift to the other party. Finally, “the 
court must ascertain whether there is compelling evidence of a common 
intention, express or inferred, subsequent to the acquisition to alter the 
beneficial interest held at the time of the acquisition. If there is, the 
beneficial interest will be held in accordance with that subsequent … 
intention” [emphasis in original].16 It is also significant that the learned 
judicial commissioner observed that while the Singapore jurisprudence 
appeared to have endorsed a selection of factors wider than just 
financial contributions, “financial contributions would lay down a clear 
if not the clearest marker of a common intention”.17 With these 
principles in mind, Ramesh JC reviewed the evidence and found that 
there was no evidence of a common intention in the case. 
                                                                        
14 [2016] SGCA 46. 
15 [2016] SGHC 113. 
16 Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin [2016] SGHC 113 at [101]. 
17 Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin [2016] SGHC 113 at [114]. 
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15.15 Ong Bee Dee v Ong Bee Chew18 was yet another family dispute 
over the property of the deceased family patriarch. It was argued that 
there was a resulting or common intention constructive trust because: 
“(a) the [family patriarch] did as he saw fit with the family companies[;] 
(b) the [family patriarch] considered that the family companies [as 
belonging to him;] and (c) there was a common understanding and 
intention based on Chinese culture and tradition that ‘it was not the 
[children]’s place to question [their father]’”.19 Thean JC did not accept 
that there was a trust over the shares. Instead, her Honour held that the 
disputed shares in the family companies were transferred over to one 
branch of the family as a gift. 
Fiduciary relationships 
15.16 Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie20 is a case 
predominantly on the law of unjust enrichment. The present review will 
only consider the discussion on fiduciary relationships. In this case, 
Mr Freddie Koh Sin Chong (“Mr Koh”), who was the former president 
of the Singapore Swimming Club (“Club”), was sued for defamation by 
four members of the immediately preceding management committee. 
A resolution was passed by the members of the Club to assume liability 
arising from any legal action brought against members of the 
management committee as a result of their discharge of duties and 
responsibilities to the Club. The High Court dismissed the defamation 
action against Mr Koh. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the High 
Court on 21 November 2011 and found Mr Koh liable for defamation. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held that Mr Koh had acted with 
malice and, therefore, could not rely on the defence of qualified 
privilege. After the release of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the club 
paid S$1.2m to various parties in relation to Mr Koh’s legal cost. On the 
facts, the Court of Appeal held that Mr Koh had acted in breach of his 
fiduciary duties to the Club by procuring the payment. The Court of 
Appeal reasoned that Mr Koh intended to further his own interest 
rather than the interest of the Club. Chao Hick Tin JA said that in view 
of the conflict of interests, Mr Koh should have asked the vice president 
of the Club to take control of this matter. Mr Koh could have called for a 
meeting of the management committee or an extraordinary general 
meeting to discuss the appropriate action to take after the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment. Mr Koh’s act of handing the invoices to the treasurer 
and financial controller was not something that he should have done. 
                                                                        
18 [2017] 3 SLR 579. 
19 Ong Bee Dee v Ong Bee Chew [2017] 3 SLR 579 at [88]. 
20 [2016] 3 SLR 845. 
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Thus, the Court of Appeal found that Mr Koh had acted in breach of 
fiduciary duty in this context. 
15.17 Dynasty Line Ltd v Sukamto Sia21 is the latest series of a long 
running litigation. The plaintiff, Dynasty Line Limited (“Dynasty”), 
a British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) company, through its liquidators, sued 
Dynasty’s only two directors, Mr Lee Howe Yong (“Lee”) and 
Mr Sukamto Sia (“Sia”), for a breach of fiduciary duty. Dynasty had 
acquired a block of shares in China Development Corporation Limited 
and Dynasty, subsequently, pledged almost all of the shares to various 
financial institutions in four transactions as security for loan facilities 
granted to Sia and his business associates. The first pledge to 
Commerzbank (South East Asia) Limited (“Commerzbank”) was 
executed by Lee and Sia while the later three pledges were executed 
solely by Sia. The first issue before the Court of Appeal was whether 
there was joint and several liability for Lee and Sia for the 
Commerzbank pledge. It should be noted that this matter is governed by 
BVI law and the Court of Appeal was, therefore, interpreting BVI law. 
Chao JA thought that joint liability, while not mandatory for every 
breach of fiduciary duty, is and remains the starting point though it is 
possible to depart from this general principle. On the facts, Chao JA 
rejected the argument that the principle of joint liability should be 
departed from in the present case for several reasons. First, the 
Commerzbank pledge was signed by both Lee and Sia. It is axiomatic 
that there is joint liability for parties who jointly sign a legal document. 
Second, it was not demonstrated to the Court of Appeal that there is any 
principle under BVI law that the “conceiver” of the breach should be 
held to be more culpable. Third, Lee had received some benefit as a 
result of the pledge. The Court of Appeal held that Lee was accorded 
subtle benefits by doing Sia’s bidding. Finally, there was no reason to 
place liability solely on the absconding director. Chao JA asked 
rhetorically, “why should the burden of pursuing an absconding director 
be placed on the victim when the culpable co-director, who had the 
means of preventing the wrong occurring, went along in participating in 
the wrongdoing?”22 This case is also important because it dealt with the 
issue of causation and valuation of the shares in awarding equitable 
compensation. The parties in this case appeared to have accepted that 
causation was applicable in the context of a claim for equitable 
compensation for breach of fiduciary duty. Dynasty argued that the date 
of valuation should be the date on which the shares would have been 
sold had there been no breach of fiduciary duty, that is, the date of the 
pledge, 23 April 1996. On the facts, the Court of Appeal found that a 
                                                                        
21 [2016] 5 SLR 505. 
22 Dynasty Line Ltd v Sukamto Sia [2016] 5 SLR 505 at [40]. 
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more appropriate date for valuation would be April 2001. Significantly, 
Chao JA held that:23 
The relevant date is that on which the shares would have been sold had 
there been no breach of fiduciary duty. In undertaking this exercise, 
the court need not ‘stop the clock’ if it has evidence to justify an 
inference as to what would have been done. In coming to such 
inferences, the court must have in mind the principle that the 
principal is fundamentally entitled to a fiduciary’s performance of his 
duties. In that sense, the court may disregard what would have been 
done if it amounts to another breach of fiduciary duty and instead put 
the principal back in a position before the breach occurred. [emphasis 
in original] 
15.18 The topic of causation for equitable compensation for a breach 
of fiduciary duty continues to be a vexed one.24 Beyonics Technology 
Ltd v Goh Chan Peng25 is the latest instalment to the debate. Hoo Sheau 
Peng JC reviewed the various approaches to causation and used the 
following approach in relation to a breach of a core duty of a well-
established category of a fiduciary relationship. Her Honour thought 
that once the principal adduces some evidence to connect the breach to 
the loss, the evidential burden on causation will shift to the breaching 
fiduciary. Hoo JC observed that:26 
[W]here there is a culpable breach of a core duty of a well-established 
category of fiduciary relationship, the burden-shifting function of the 
Brickenden rule is sensible in that it does not hold the fiduciary liable 
for all losses linked in some way to his breach (as would occur if the 
fiduciary was not afforded the chance of exonerating himself from 
liability), but nonetheless deters breaches of core fiduciary duties … 
15.19 With respect, the current Singapore authorities on causation in 
relation to equitable compensation which are all at the High Court level 
appear to be over-refined and difficult to apply. One wonders whether it 
is possible or desirable to classify breaches of fiduciary duties into 
different categories and then to apply different rules of causation to 
different kinds of breaches. Central to the Singapore High Court’s 
approach is the assumption that equitable compensation for breach of 
fiduciary duties is meant to serve a deterrent function which justifies a 
different rule of causation. The present reviewer suggests that this is not 
an accurate view of equitable compensation. Equitable compensation is 
                                                                        
23 Dynasty Line Ltd v Sukamto Sia [2016] 5 SLR 505 at [45]. 
24 See Yip Man & Goh Yihan, “Navigating The Maze: Making Sense of Equitable 
Compensation and Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2016) 
28 SAcLJ 884. 
25 [2016] 4 SLR 472. 
26 Beyonics Technology Ltd v Goh Chan Peng [2016] 4 SLR 472 at [137]; see also 
Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co of Canada [1934] 3 DLR 465. 
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meant primarily to compensate the principal and not to deter fiduciary 
breaches. Other remedies such as an account of profits or a declaration 
of a constructive trust are more appropriate devices to further the 
deterrence function associated with a breach of fiduciary duty. No 
doubt, this issue will have to be clarified in the future by the Singapore 
Court of Appeal. 
15.20 In Max-Sun Trading Ltd v Tang Mun Kit,27 a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty by creditors of an insolvent company was instituted 
against the directors of the insolvent company. Judith Prakash JA made 
short shrift of this claim and said that this claim was legally 
misconceived. As a matter of law, a director of a company did not owe 
any fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors. Hence, this claim was 
dismissed. 
Unconscionable receipt and dishonest assistance 
15.21 Heinrich Pte Ltd v Lau Kim Huat28 dealt, inter alia, with a claim 
for dishonest assistance of a breach of fiduciary duty. Abdullah JC 
confirmed that a claim for dishonest assistance could operate without 
property being involved – it was sufficient for the assistance to relate to 
a breach of fiduciary duties. On the facts, Abdullah JC did not find any 
evidence of dishonesty. 
Accounts and equitable accounting 
15.22 Chng Weng Wah v Goh Bak Heng29 dealt with a trustee’s duty to 
account. In this case, the appellant held certain shares on trust for the 
respondent. The respondent brought an action against the appellant to 
provide an account in respect of the shares or such moneys or funds 
representing the sale proceeds of those shares. The Court of Appeal 
observed that in the present context, the parties were concerned with 
the accounting of funds, specifically that of a general or common 
account. There are three stages inherent in a claim for a common 
account, namely:30 
(a) whether the claimant has a right to an account; 
(b) the taking of the account; and 
(c) any consequential relief. 
                                                                        
27 [2016] 5 SLR 815. 
28 [2016] SGHC 116. 
29 [2016] 2 SLR 464. 
30 Chng Weng Wah v Goh Bak Heng [2016] 2 SLR 464 at [22]. 
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However, these three stages are not necessarily always discrete inquiries. 
Chao JA observed that in the course of proceedings based on the 
evidence which had been led, “the court [might] be able to draw an 
inference, on a balance of probabilities, that settled accounts [had] 
already been provided (ie, at some earlier point in time)” [emphasis in 
original].31 Chao JA dismissed this claim on the basis of laches.32 In this 
case, the length of delay was almost 13 years. On the facts, the Court of 
Appeal thought that the appellant and other potential witnesses might 
not be in a position to recall the sequence of events or to make sense of 
the documentary evidence available. Furthermore, this was not a case 
involving a straightforward claim for an ascertained property in the 
trustee’s possession. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that it was 
unconscionable for the respondent to seek an account from the 
appellant after such an inordinate delay, especially where both parties 
had conducted their affairs on a relatively informal basis with limited 
documentation. 
15.23 Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne33 (“Su Emmanuel”) 
is certain to be an extremely influential decision in Singapore and, 
possibly, other parts of the Commonwealth. This case dealt with the 
tricky relationship between resulting trust, constructive trust, and 
equitable accounting. This is a rare decision in the Commonwealth 
where the doctrine of equitable accounting is fully fleshed out. In this 
case, a dispute arose between, Philip, Su, and Priya. Philip was married 
to Su, and Priya was his sister. The dispute was about the ownership of a 
flat in Braddell Hill. The flat was initially owned by Philip and Su in 
their joint names. They fell into financial difficulty and Priya decided to 
help the couple out. Specifically, she purchased 49% of the property 
from Philip. Therefore, the resultant ownership of the flat was Priya 
at 49%, Philip at 1%, and Su at 50%. All three of them took a fresh 
mortgage over the property and they undertook to repay the new loan. 
However, as matters turned out, Priya almost single handedly paid the 
mortgage instalments. Subsequently, Priya fell into financial difficulty 
and she brought the current proceedings for an order of sale and a 
determination of her beneficial interest in the property. Priya argued 
that there was a resulting trust in excess of 49% over the property in her 
favour due to her payment towards the mortgage. Menon CJ rejected 
this argument and observed forcefully that “no presumption of resulting 
trust can possibly arise in this case because it was not possible for Priya 
to have purchased more than 49% of the Property” [emphasis in 
                                                                        
31 Chng Weng Wah v Goh Bak Heng [2016] 2 SLR 464 at [39]. 
32 Cf Lim Sing Yong, “Laches Unleashed: How (Not) to Bar A Claim for a Common 
Account; ‘Chng Weng Wah v Goh Bak Heng’ [2016] 2 SLR 464” (2016) 
28 SAcLJ 680. 
33 [2016] 3 SLR 1222. 
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original].34 The learned Chief Justice observed astutely that the fact that 
“Priya later contributed to the mortgage repayments could not alter the 
beneficial interest which she had obtained at the time of her purchase of 
a share in the Property”.35 Similarly, there could not be a common 
intention for the beneficial interest to deviate from the registered 
interest of the parties. 
15.24 However, this did not mean that Priya did not have any recourse 
with regard to the moneys she had paid towards the mortgage. Priya 
could resort to the principles of equitable accounting in respect of these 
sums. This judgment is significant because it provides a lucid and 
insightful analysis of equitable accounting. Quoting a well-known 
textbook, Menon CJ accepted the following definition of equitable 
accounting between co-owners of land as “the process by which the 
financial burdens and benefits of land shared by co-owners are adjusted 
between them”.36 The Chief Justice also pointed out that equitable 
accounting “has been applied in a variety of contexts to take account of 
such things as mortgage repayments, improvements and repairs to the 
property and rents and profits derived”.37 In relation to contribution 
towards mortgage payments, the Chief Justice said succinctly:38 
[T]he extent to which each party is expected to contribute to 
mortgage repayments will largely depend on the common 
understanding or agreement between the parties at the time the 
mortgage is taken out … this will usually affect the beneficial interests 
of the parties. If there is a material departure from that common 
understanding, and one party repays more of the mortgage than was 
initially envisaged, then equitable accounting may be brought into 
play, unless it is shown that at the time the mortgage repayments were 
made, the payor had the intention to benefit the other co-owners. This 
follows from the fact that the basis underlying the remedy of equitable 
accounting is a notional request to contribute so as to restore the 
parties to what had been their common understanding at the time the 
mortgage was taken out; but if the evidence is that the payor intended 
to benefit the other co-owners, there would be no room for any such 
notional request for contribution to be inferred. In these 
circumstances, equity will not require a co-owner to contribute. 
[emphasis in original] 
15.25 On the facts, the common understanding was that Priya and 
Philip would jointly pay off the mortgage instalments. Since there was a 
                                                                        
34 Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 at [80]. 
35 Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 at [81]. 
36 Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 at [96]. 
37 Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 at [97]. 
38 Su Emmanuel v Emmanuel Priya Ethel Anne [2016] 3 SLR 1222 at [105]. 
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deviation from this common understanding, Priya was entitled to call in 
aid the doctrine of equitable accounting. 
15.26 The influence of Su Emmanuel was felt almost immediately. In 
Foo Jee Boo v Foo Jee Seng,39 Debbie Ong JC applied the principles of 
equitable accounting and allowed a party to be reimbursed the sums 
paid in excess of his own agreed share of the obligations. Significantly, 
Ong JC held that the additional payment to the mortgage instalments by 
one party did not make the beneficial interests different from the 
registered interests. 
15.27 Foo Jee Boo v Foo Jhee Tuang40 is an example where the High 
Court had to delve into the minutiae of a duty to account in relation to a 
trust and estate claim. George Wei J had to painstakingly go through 
many expenses to determine whether these expenses were justified on 
the facts. 
Quistclose trusts 
15.28 In CCM Industrial Pte Ltd v Chan Pui Yee,41 a Quistclose trust 
was alleged in the proceedings. Chua JC (as his Honour then was) said 
that for an express Quistclose trust, it must be sufficiently certain that 
the settlor-donor intends to constitute the recipient as a trustee and to 
confer a power or duty on the recipient-trustee to apply the money 
exclusively for the stated purpose. In the present case, there was no 
Quistclose trust because there was no certainty of subject matter as the 
funds were not segregated. Furthermore, there was no connection 
between the loan and the actual moneys disbursed for the stated 
purpose. 
15.29 Verona Capital Pty Ltd v Ramba Energy West Jambi Ltd42 also 
involved a failed Quistclose trust. Abdullah JC helpfully restated the 
principles when determining whether such a trust exist as follows:43 
(a) It was intended that the money was at the free disposal of the 
recipient[.] 
(b) A representation by the recipient that it intends to use the 
money for a particular purpose is insufficient[.] 
(c) The express terms are, or the objective position is, that it was 
the mutual intention of the parties, and the essence of their bargain, 
                                                                        
39 [2016] SGHC 225. 
40 [2016] SGHC 260. 
41 [2016] SGHC 231. 
42 [2016] SGHC 55. 
43 Verona Capital Pty Ltd v Ramba Energy West Jambi Ltd [2016] SGHC 55 at [88]. 
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that the funds should not be part of the general assets of the recipient 
but used exclusively for identified payments, so that if the money 
cannot be so used, it is to be returned. 
15.30 On the facts, Abdullah JC did not find the following features in 
the contractual agreement between the parties and, hence, no Quistclose 
trust arose. 
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